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Abstract
The rapid proliferation of Internet and related tech-
nologies has created tremendous possibilities for the in-
teroperability between domains in distributed environ-
ments. Interoperability does not come easy at it opens
the way for several security and privacy breaches. In
this paper, we focus on the distributed authorization
discovery problem that is crucial to enable secure inter-
operability. We present a distributed access path dis-
covery framework that does not require a centralized
mediator. We propose and verify a role routing pro-
tocol that propagates secure, minimal-length paths to
reachable roles in other domains. Finally, we present
experimental results of our role routing protocol based
on a simulation implementation.
1. Introduction
Globalization has removed the barriers between
markets, organizations, researchers and societies. In
such a connected world, there are immense opportu-
nities for collaboration in distributed environments.
For example, enterprises are continuously splitting pro-
cesses into several tasks across organizational bound-
aries to combine their efforts and become virtual en-
terprises [10, 20]. Furthermore, in recent years there
has been an increasing demand to allow scientific insti-
tutions to collaborate in the management and analysis
of the vast quantities of data generated by scientific
experiments [12, 1].
With all the advantages that multi-domain collabo-
ration is promising to offer it does not come easy as it
opens the way for several security breaches. Security
is hard to achieve in a centralized system [13, 14, 25],
let alone in a dynamic distributed mediator-free envi-
ronment. In a mediator-free collaboration environment
there is no central trusted entity having a global view
of the collaboration environment and handling security.
Instead, domains have a limited view of the collabora-
tion environment through their neighboring domains.
In such an environment, domains collaborate to find re-
sources and authorizations required to access resources
across domain boundaries. For example, in distributed
database environments interoperability enables users
to access databases in different domains; but how can a
domain acquire the required set of authorizations that
enable access to the requested remote databases?
Discovering authorizations in mediator-free environ-
ments where none of the domains has a global view of
the collaboration environment is a challenging task. In
this paper, we present a role routing protocol (RRP)
that efficiently propagates optimal access path infor-
mation between domains. In RRP domains are not
required to have a global view of the collaboration en-
vironment; instead domains only interact with their
neighboring domains. RRP discovers secure access
paths that have minimal length. The main contribu-
tions of the paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a role routing protocol (RRP) that
enables domains to propagate information about
secure, minimal-length paths to destination roles.
We show correctness and security of our role rout-
ing protocol.
• With a proof of concept implementation of role
routing protocol we conducted experiments to
compare our RRP with the shortest path and the
flooding protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes some preliminary concepts to facili-
tate background for the rest of the paper. Section 3
describes and analyzes the operation of our proposed
role routing protocol. The experimental results are pre-
sented in Section 4. The related work is discussed in




In our framework, we assume that all the domains
adopt a role-based access control (RBAC) model [11, 7]
to model their access control policies. The analysis
presented in this paper can still be applied when other
access control models are adopted. We have chosen
RBAC because it is suitable for specifying the security
requirements of a wide range of commercial, medical,
government applications [23, 3, 2] and moreover it is
being standardized by the National Institute of Stan-
dards [11]. A domain that does not use RBAC as its ac-
cess control model can easily generate an export RBAC
policy to join the collaboration. In RBAC, permis-
sions are associated with roles, and users are granted
membership in appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the
roles’ permissions. The access control policy of a do-
main Di is modeled as a directed graph Gi = 〈Vi, Ai〉
where the vertex set Vi represents roles and the arcs
set Ai represents the dominance relationship between
roles. For example, if role r1 dominates r2, (r2  r1),
then (r1, r2) ∈ Ai. A user that has acquired role r1
can acquire all other roles r2 in that domain such that
r2  r1 [6].
2.1. Secure Interoperability
Collaboration among domains involves the interop-
eration of their access control policies. Domains typi-
cally achieve interoperation among their access control
policies by introducing cross mappings between these
policies [13, 14]. These mappings relate roles in dif-
ferent domains, and are represented by a set of cross
domain arcs referred to as the set F . We will refer
to such mappings as cross links. A cross link (rx, ry),
indicates that a user acquiring the role rx in domain
D(rx) is able to acquire role ry in domain D(ry). Fig-
ure 1, shows the crosslinks as the dotted edges con-
necting roles in neighboring domains. In the present
work we assume that the cross domain mappings are
selected by the administrators of the domains accord-
ing to the interoperability requirements of each system.
These links could be selected when the service level
agreements (SLA) are negotiated [28, 8]. Furthermore,
the domain administrators agree on a set of restricted
cross links that are prohibited during the collaboration.
These restricted access links are similar to negative
authorizations adopted in several access control mod-
els [5, 11, 6, 7]. The restricted access is a binary relation
R on
⋃n
i=1 Vi such that ∀(u, v) ∈ R, u ∈ Vi, v ∈ Vj ,
and i 6= j, where these edges in R are prohibited
during interoperation. For example in Figure 1, if
(rA1, rD2) ∈ R then a user acquiring role rA1 is not
permitted to acquire role rD2. Gong et al. [13, 14]
proposed a solution to ensure secure interoperability.
However, this solution is centralized, assumes a static




























Figure 1. Collaboration and violations.
2.2. Mediator-Free Secure Interoperability
In a mediator-free collaboration environment there
is no central mediator or trusted party managing and
ensuring secure interoperability among the collaborat-
ing domains. In such an environment, none of the col-
laborating domains has a global view of all the access
control policies; instead the domains view the collabo-
ration environment only through their established cross
links. Domains have to collaborate in making access
control decisions and to avoid possible violations. She-
hab et al. [27, 26] presented a framework for secure col-
laboration in mediator-free environments. This frame-
work is based on using the access history to dynami-
cally make access control decisions. The access history
is encoded in the access path, which is the sequence
of roles acquired from the home domain to target do-
mains in the collaboration environment. Using the ac-
cess path to make access control decisions shares ideas
with the Chinese Wall security policy [4]. The access
path enables domains to make local access control de-
cisions and to avoid violations without the need for the
global view of the collaboration environment. A secure
access path is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Let P = {r1, r2, . . . , rn} be an access
path, where i < j implies that role ri was acquired be-
fore rj. Let D(ri) denote the domain of role ri. The
path P is secure if it satisfies the following conditions:
C1. For all i < j and ri, rj ∈ P , if D(ri) = D(rj)
then rj  ri.
C2. For all ri, ri+1 ∈ P , if D(ri) 6= D(ri+1) then
(ri, ri+1) ∈ F .
C3. For all i < j and ri, rj ∈ P , (ri, rj) 6∈ R.
Where  refers to the dominance relationship, that
is rj  ri means ri dominates rj . Condition C1 ensures
that roles acquired from the same domain are acquired
according to the domain’s role hierarchy. This ensures
that the access control policies of the domains included
in the path are not violated. Conditions C2 and C3
ensure that sets F and R are honored.
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3. Role Routing Protocol (RRP)
Domains in a mediator-free environment have a lim-
ited view of the collaboration environment through
their neighboring domains with which they have es-
tablished cross links. Domains also know about the re-
stricted access relations that they are involved in. Col-
laboration with non-neighboring domains is made pos-
sible by building secure access paths through neighbor-
ing domains. In order to enable such multi-hop collab-
oration, a distributed algorithm is needed to discover
and maintain role reachability information between the
collaborating domains. In this section we present our
distributed protocol that enables secure role routing.
3.1. Role Routing Problem Definition
Cross links are the main enablers of collaboration
between domains. A cross link (rx, ry) starts at an exit
role rx and ends at an entry role ry; we say role ry is
an out-neighbor of role rx, and that role rx is an in-
neighbor of role ry. An internal role is a role that is
neither an exit nor an entry role. We define the path
length of a path P , referred to as l(P ), as the number
of cross links it contains. The role routing problem is
defined as follows:
Definition 2 Given n collaborating domains D1, . . . ,
Dn, a set of cross links F = {F (D1), . . . , F (Dn)} and
a set of restricted links R = {R(D1), . . . , R(Dn)} where
F (Di) and R(Di) denotes the set of cross links and re-
stricted links of domain Di respectively, find for each
domain Di the optimal paths from its exit roles to en-
try roles of other domains, where an optimal path from
role rx to ry is a secure path whose length is less than
or equal to that of any secure path from rx to ry.
The role routing problem satisfies the Principle of
Least Privilege [22], which requires that each principal
be accorded the minimum access privileges needed to
accomplish its task. In the context of secure collab-
oration, the principle of least privilege implies choos-
ing access paths that minimize the path authorizations
which are consequently the shortest secure paths. A
major challenge in role routing is the presence of re-
stricted access relations between roles in different do-
mains. Figure 2, shows an example collaboration en-
vironment, where there is a restricted access relation
(r1, r3). This implies that roles r1 and r3 are prohibited
to coexist in a secure path. The shortest path from role
r1 to role r4 is path P1 = {r1, r2, r3, r4}, however this
is not an optimal because it is not secure as it includes
both r1 and r3. The path P2 = {r1, r2, r5, r6, r7, r8, r4}
is optimal as it is the shortest secure path from r1 to
r4. Another interesting observation is that the optimal
path from r2 to r4 is P3 = {r2, r3, r4} which does not
overlap with optimal path from r1 to r4. These obser-
vations imply that when designing a distributed role
routing protocol in which domains advertise paths to
their neighbors, they may have to advertise multiple
paths to the same destination. This is unlike network
routing protocols which require only the advertisement
of the “best” path to a certain destination [24]. In Fig-
ure 2, role r2 is aware of two paths to r4. In the context
of this example, both of these paths should be adver-
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Figure 2. Optimal path, where (r1, r3) ∈ R.
3.2. Summary of Operation
The role routing protocol (RRP) is a distributed
path-vector protocol [18, 21] whereby the basic unit
of information stored at the domains and exchanged
between them is in the form of an access path. In
RRP, domains send path information updates to their
neighboring domains, specifically their in-neighboring
domains. For example in Figure 2, domain D(r2)
sends path updates to domain D(r1), to describe roles
reachable via the cross link (r1, r2). The role routing
protocol discovers optimal paths to roles in different
domains. Domains running RRP maintain and store
paths in three local path information tables (PIT)s;
PIT-Out, PIT-In, and PIT-Loc. Paths that are adver-
tised to neighboring domains are stored in PIT-Out,
paths that are received from neighboring domains are
stored in PIT-In, and optimal paths to entry and exit
roles reachable from the local exit roles are stored in
PIT-Loc. The PIT-Loc is a partial map of the collabo-
ration environment representing the view with respect
to the current domain. RRP does not require domains
to retransmit the entire set of previously advertised
paths, instead path advertisements are sent to neigh-
boring domains incrementally and only in response to
path updates. Upon receiving path advertisements,
domains update their path information tables accord-
ingly and propagate relevant changes to their neigh-
boring domains. In response to path failures, domains
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send path withdrawal messages to their neighboring do-
mains. Domains ensure the alive status of neighboring
domains by periodically sending Keep-Alive messages.
Paths advertised by domains are loop free as RRP en-
sures that paths sent from domain Di to domain Dj
should not include roles from domain Dj .
To enable domains to identify the set of potential op-
timal paths to advertise to their neighboring domains,
RRT requires domains to mark roles in paths that have
potential violations. The set of potential violators is
defined as follows:
Definition 3 The set of potential violators of a path
P , denoted by pv(P ), is the set of roles r ∈ P such
that r is involved in a restricted access relation of the
form (rx, r) ∈ R where rx is any role not in the same
domain as r.
A domain updates the set of potential violators of a
path before advertising it to its neighboring domains.
For example in Figure 2, if path P = {r3, r4} is to
be advertised by domain D(r3) to domain D(r2), then
domain D(r3) would mark role r3 in path P to indi-
cate that role r3 might be involved in a violation, as
(r1, r3) ∈ R. Propagating the set of potential viola-
tors of a path enables domains to make smart deci-




















Figure 3. Path information tables.
3.3. Handling Path Advertisements
Received path advertisements contain a set of
new paths reachable through the advertising domains.
When a domain Di receives a path advertisement





new paths in AdvIn are stored into PIT-In only if these
paths do not violate the restricted access relations of
domain Di. Figure 4 shows the InputF ilter() algo-
rithm that is executed by domain Di upon receiving an
advertisement. The InputF ilter() algorithm generates
a list of secure paths from AdvIn, which we refer to as
FilteredAdv. Then the InputF ilter() stores the paths
in FilteredAdv into PIT-In. The updates in PIT-In
should be propagated to neighboring domains and to
PIT-Loc respectively.
InputFilter():




Output: FilteredAdv = Adv. with no violating paths
1. FilteredAdv = {}
2. For all paths P ∈ InAdv, Insert (rXi ◦ P ) into
FilteredAdv if,
(a) For all roles r ∈ P , (rXi , r) 6∈ R(Di),
3. Store FilteredAdv into PIT-In
4. Return FilteredAdv
OutputFilter():
Input: FilteredAdv = Filtered Advertisement received on
(rXi , r
E
j ) at domain Di with no violating paths.
Output: AdvToBeSent to be sent to domain Dk on cross
link (rXk , r
E
i ).
1. Dst ← Set of destination roles reachable from paths
in FilteredAdv.
2. Adv ← All paths in PIT-In from rXi to roles in Dst.
3. AdvToBeSent ← {}.
4. For each P ∈ Adv, remove P from Adv if,
(a) There exists r ∈ P where (rEi , r) ∈ R(Di), OR
(b) Dk ∈ D(P ).
5. For each destination role r ∈ Dst
(a) PtoR← paths in Adv to destination role r.
(b) For each path P ∈ PtoR insert (rEi ◦ P ) into
AdvToBeSent if
i. For all paths Q ∈ PtoR such that pv(Q) ⊆
pv(P ), l(P ) ≤ l(Q), AND
ii. P 6∈ PIT-Out.
6. Store AdvToBeSent into PIT-Out.
7. Send AdvToBeSent to domain Dk.
LocalFilter():




1. Dst ← Set of destination roles reachable from paths
in FilteredAdv.
2. For each destination role r ∈ Dst
(a) P ← min length path in FilteredAdv to
destination role r.
(b) Q ← min length path in PIT-Loc from rXi to r.
(c) if l(P ) < l(Q), then delete Q from PIT-Loc and
insert P into PIT-Loc.
Figure 4. Algorithms executed by domain Di
upon receiving path advertisements.
The updates in PIT-In will only be propagated to
neighboring domains connected to domain Di through




i , where role
rXi is the exit role at which the advertisement was re-
ceived. For each neighboring domain Dk connected to




i ), domain Di selects
a set of potential optimal paths from role rEi to des-
tination roles affected by the updates to PIT-In. The
set of potential optimal paths from a source role to a
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destination role is defined as follows:
Definition 4 Let SPrs,rd be a set of paths from role
rs to role rd. A path P ∈ SPrs,rd belongs to the set of
potential optimal paths SP ∗rs,rd if:
• For every path Q ∈ SPrx,ry such that
pv(Q) ⊆ pv(P ) and l(P ) ≤ l(Q).
Note that the potential optimal paths are selected
based on both the set of potential violators and the
path length. The main motivation is to select short
paths with small violation sets, as these paths have a
greater potential of propagating further between do-
mains without getting dropped by a domain due to a
violation. On the other hand, we would also like to
store shortest paths even if they are marked with more
restrictions, as roles not involved in those restrictions
would still be able to use them. Formally, paths with
more restrictions are included in SP ∗ if they are shorter
than all other known paths that are marked with only
some of their potential violators. For example, given
a path set SP = {P1, P2} we could have the following
cases:
• pv(P1) ⊆ pv(P2). Then, P1 ∈ SP
∗ and P2 ∈ SP
∗
only if l(P2) ≤ l(P1).
• pv(P1) 6⊆ pv(P2). Then, P1, P2 ∈ SP
∗ as the po-
tential violator set of one does not dominate that
of the other.
Figure 4 shows the OutputF ilter() algorithm that do-
main Di uses to select the set of potential optimal
paths to send to domain Dk, upon receiving the filtered
advertisement FilteredAdv from the InputF ilter().
Domain Di finds all paths to destination roles in
FilteredAdv, then it selects the paths that do not vi-
olate the restricted access set R(Di) after the role r
E
i
is prepended to them. To avoid loops, selected paths
are only included in an advertisement if they do not
include any roles from domain Dk. Then the potential
optimal set is computed as described earlier. The se-
lected paths are only advertised if they are not included
in PIT-Out. After the paths are advertised they are
stored in PIT-Out.
The changes in PIT-In should also be propagated
to PIT-Loc of domain Di. The PIT-Loc table of do-
main Di stores the optimal paths from entry and exit
roles of Di to destination roles in other domains. After
being updated, if PIT-In contains a path P to desti-
nation role rd from role r
X
i which is shorter than the
path recorded in PIT-Loc, then this path should be
recorded in PIT-Loc. Figure 4 shows the LocalF ilter()
which propagates the updates in PIT-In to PIT-Loc. A
maximum path length Pmax is required to limit path
forwarding to paths shorter than Pmax.
3.4. Handling Path Withdrawal
Path withdrawal messages are sent by a domain to
notify neighboring domains that a set of previously
advertised paths are no longer reachable. Upon re-
ceiving a path withdrawal message, domain Di should
remove all withdrawn paths from its PIT-In. Further-
more, domain Di should inspect its PIT-Out to see if
any of the withdrawn paths were previously advertised
to its neighboring domains. If some of the withdrawn
paths have been advertised previously, then domain Di
should perform the following steps:
S1. Domain Di should send a path withdrawal mes-
sage to domains it has previously advertised the
withdrawn paths.
S2. The deleted set of withdrawn paths might af-
fect the set of potential optimal paths. Do-
main Di should run a procedure similar to the
OutputF ilter() algorithm to find a new set of re-
placement paths to the same destinations as the
withdrawn paths. Then domain Di should send
path advertisements with replacement paths to its
neighboring domains.
S3. If any of the withdrawn paths is included in PIT-
Loc, then this path should also be removed from
PIT-Loc. Then domain Di should search for an
optimal path to the same destination in PIT-Out,
which is a procedure similar to the LocalF ilter()
algorithm.
Figure 5 shows the FindAdvertised() and Refilter()
algorithms that perform the steps described above.
3.5. Correctness Analysis
In this section, we prove the correctness of RRP. For
a path P = {rn, . . . , r0} we denote by P [rk . . . rl] the
corresponding sub-path {rk, rk−1, . . . , rl}. The right
sub-path of path P split at role rk is denoted by
P [rk . . . r0].
Lemma 1 Let P ∗ = {rs, . . . , rk−1, rk, . . . , rd} be an
optimal path from role rs to role rd. The right sub-
path P ∗[rk . . . rd] of an optimal path P
∗ split at any
role rk ∈ P
∗ is shorter than or equal in length to any
other secure path Pα from role rk to role rd such that
pv(Pα) ⊆ pv(P
∗[rk . . . rd]).
Proof. Let P ∗ = {rs, . . . , rk−1, rk, . . . , rd} be an opti-
mal path from role rs to role rd. Assume path P
∗ is
split such that P ∗ = Pl ◦ Pr where Pl = P
∗[rs . . . rk−1]
and Pr = P
∗[rk . . . rd]. Assume that there is another
path Pα from role rk to rd such that:
1. pv(Pα) ⊆ pv(Pr). AND
2. l(Pα) < l(Pr).
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FindAdvertised():
Input: Withdrawn = Set of withdrawn paths received on
cross link (rXi , r
E
j ) at domain Di
Output: PreAdv = Previously advertised paths.
1. Delete all paths in Withdrawn from PIT-In.
2. PreAdv = {}
3. domEntry ← Set of entry roles r such that rXi ≤ r.
4. For all paths P ∈ Withdrawn,
(a) For all roles r ∈ domEntry, and (r ◦ P ) ∈
PIT-Out, insert (r ◦ P ) into PreAdv
5. Delete all paths in PreAdv from PIT-Out.
6. Return PreAdv
ReFilter():
Input: PreAdv = Previously advertised paths to be
resolved. (rXi , r
E
j ) at domain Di, to be sent to domain Dk
on (rXk , r
E
i ).
1. Dst ← Set of destination roles reachable from paths
in PreAdv.
2. Adv← All paths in PIT-In from rXi to roles in Dst.
3. AdvToBeSent← {}.
4. For each P ∈ Adv, remove P from Adv if,
(a) There exists r ∈ P where (rEi , r) ∈ R(Di), OR
(b) Dk ∈ D(P ).
5. For each destination role r ∈ Dst
(a) PtoR ← paths in Adv to destination role r.
(b) For each path P ∈ PtoR insert P into
AdvToBeSent if
i. For all paths Q ∈ PtoR such that pv(Q) ⊆
pv(P ) AND l(P ) ≤ l(Q), AND
ii. P 6∈ PIT-Out.
6. Store AdvToBeSent into PIT-Out.
7. Send Advertisement AdvToBeSent to domain Dk.
8. Send Withdrawal PreAdv to domain Dk.
Figure 5. Algorithms executed by Di upon
receiving path withdrawals from neighboring
domains.
Then, we can form a path P
′∗ = Pl ◦ Pα. Since
pv(Pα) ⊆ pv(Pr), P
′∗ is secure. Also, l(P
′∗) < l(P ∗)
as shown below:
l(P
′∗) = l(Pl) + l(Pα)
= l(Pl) + l(Pr) − l(Pr) + l(Pα)
= l(P ∗) − l(Pr) + l(Pα)
However this contradicts our initial assumption that
P ∗ is an optimal path. Therefore, no such Pα can
exist. 2
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0 . For any
pair of domains D(rk), D(rk−1), 0 < k ≤ n, when do-
main D(rk) receives P
∗[rEk−1 . . . r
X
0 ] it advertises path
P ∗[rEk . . . r
X
0 ] to domain D(rk+1).









be an optimal path from role rXn to role r
X
0 . Let
P ∗k−1 = P
∗[rEk−1, . . . , r
X
0 ]. By the assumption that P
∗





potential optimal path from role rEk−1 to role r
X
0 , and
P ∗k−1 will be advertised from domain D(rk−1) to do-





k−1} will be advertised from domain D(rk)
to domain D(rk+1). This means we need to show that:




k−1}. If path P
∗
k−1∈InAdv
before the execution of InputF ilter(), then
path P ink ∈FilteredAdv after the execution of
InputF ilter().




k }. If path P
in
k ∈ FilteredAdv
then after the execution of OutputF ilter() path
P ∗k ∈ AdvToBeSent.
(Proof for (F1)). By statement (2a) of InputF ilter(),
for all paths P ∈ InAdv, a path rXk ◦P
will be added to FilteredAdv if for all roles
r ∈ P, (rXk , r) 6∈ R(D(rk)). As P
∗ is secure and
P ink ⊆ P
∗, P ink is also secure. Therefore, for all
roles ri, rj∈ P
in
k , i ≥ j, (ri, rj)6∈
⋃k
m=0 R(D(rm)).
Therefore path P ink ∈ FilteredAdv after the execution
of InputF ilter().
(Proof for (F2)). After statement (2) of
OutputF ilter(), path P ink is in Adv. Let
P ∗k = P
∗[rEk , . . . , r
X
0 ]. As P
∗ is secure and P ∗k ⊆ P
∗,
P ∗k is also secure. Therefore,
for all roles ri, rj ∈ P
∗





We also observe that since P ∗ is secure, each domain





By (1) and (2), P ink is not removed from Adv by state-
ment (4) of OutputF ilter().
Consider the iteration of statement (5) for r = rX0 .
After the execution of statement (5a), P ink is in PtoR.
Now consider the iteration of the nested loop in state-
ment (5b) for P = P ink . By Lemma 1, path P
∗
k is in
AdvToBeSent after the execution of statement (5). 2
Theorem 1 implies that domains forward all optimal
paths, thus proving the correctness of the algorithm.
The proof for the correctness in the case of path with-
drawals as not included as it follows the same guide-
lines as the above proof. This is due to the fact that
the new optimal paths are already stored in PIT-In,
and they will be advertised after a withdrawal message
is received, as indicated in Figure 5.
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3.6. Security Analysis
In this section we show that that the generated ac-
cess paths do not contain any security violations and
respect the access control policies of the involved do-
mains.
Theorem 2 The access paths stored and advertised by
RRP are secure access paths.











to be secure it must satisfy conditions C1, C2, and
C3 discussed in Section 2.2. Condition C1 is satis-
fied because RRP advertises a path only through the
entry roles that dominate exit roles on which the path
was received, that is rEi  r
X
i for all domains Di ∈
D(Pn). Condition C2 is satisfied because RRP ad-
vertises paths only through the established cross links
between domains. We prove that condition C3 holds
by induction. The inductive hypothesis is that path
Pk is stored by Dk only if it does not violate the re-
stricted access set
⋃k
i=0 R(Di), that is for all i < j
and ri, ri ∈ Pk, (ri, rj) 6∈
⋃k
i=0 R(Di). (Base Case),
P0 = {r
X
0 }. P0 contains a single role and thus does not
violate any restricted access sets. (Inductive Step) As-










0 } for some k ≥ 0
does not violate the restricted access set
⋃k
i=0 R(Di)
and is stored by domain Dk. Note that path Pk+1 is ob-
tained by prepending roles rXk+1 and r
E
k to Pk. By Defi-
nition 2, all restricted accesses that involve rXk+1 and r
E
k
are listed in R(Dk+1) and R(Dk) respectively. Domain
Dk checks that path rk ◦Pk does not violate R(Dk) be-
fore sending an advertisement to domain Dk+1, as in-
dicated in OutputF ilter() Step 4. Domain Dk+1 checks
that the path rXk+1 ◦ r
E
k ◦ Pk does not violate R(Dk+1)
before storing the received advertisement, as indicated
in InputF ilter() Step 2. Therefore, the path Pk+1 is




































Figure 6. Generation of a sample secure path
Path authentication can easily be maintained by us-
ing an onion signing technique proposed by Shehab et
al. [31, 26] which ensures that paths are not tapered
with during their transition between domains.
4. Experimental Results
This section describes the experimental evaluation
of RRP based on our proof of concept implementation
that simulates the collaboration environment. All the
experiments were performed on Intel Pentium IV CPU
3.2GHz with 512MB RAM and running Linux. Java
J2SE v5.0 and the Psim-J simulation library [17] were
used as the implementation platform. Each domain is
simulated as a process with an single message queue.
The queuing policy is FIFO. To forward path advertise-
ments domains insert messages in the receiver’s mes-
sage queue. Each domain has an access role hierarchy
which is implemented as a binary tree. Domains se-
lect their neighboring domains subject to a probabil-
ity p, then the crosslinks are generated randomly be-
tween each of the neighboring domains. The generated
crosslinks are introduced into the simulated collabora-
tion environment using a crosslink scheduler process.
Each domain maintains a PIT-In and PIT-Out
database. Several evaluation metrics are collected,
which include the number of discovered roles and the
size of PIT-In and PIT-Out. The collected metrics were
averaged over all the domains in the collaboration net-
work and over several repeated simulation runs. The
metrics collected for RRP were compared with metrics
collected for the shortest path protocol and the flood-
ing protocol. The shortest path protocol forwards only
paths of minimal length without using the potential
violators set. The flooding protocol forwards adver-
tisements about every discovered secure path. The pre-
sented experiments will investigate the effect of varying
several parameters such as the neighborhood probabil-
ity p and the maximum path length Pmax on the role
routing protocols.
4.1. Varying Neighborhood Probability p
Domains select their neighboring domains randomly
with probability p. Increasing the value of p would
connect more domains and would result in the rout-
ing protocol discovering more roles in other domains.
In this experiment the number of domains was fixed
to 100 domains, and the maximum path length Pmax
was set to 15. The value of p was varied from 0.1
to 0.9. Figure 7(a) shows the number of discovered
roles by RRP, shortest path protocol (SPP), and the
flooding protocol. The number of discovered roles is
monotonically increasing with respect to p. Note that,
the number of roles discovered by RRP and flooding
protocol are equal. The flooding protocol forwards all
possible secure paths between domains, which implies
that the flooding protocol computes a cover of all pos-
sible secure paths. Therefore, RRP discovering equal
7





















































































Figure 7. Neighborhood Probability p.





















































































































































































Figure 9. Accumulated Metrics for RRP.











































































Figure 10. Varying the value of Pmax.
8
number of roles as the flooding protocol is an indica-
tion to the correctness of RRP as proven analytically
in Section 3.5. Also note, that RRP consistently dis-
covers more roles than SPP. This is because SPP for-
wards path advertisements for only the shortest paths
and does not use the potential violator set to make
forwarding decisions. Furthermore, this supports our
argument that using the shortest path criteria alone
fail to compute optimal access paths, as discussed in
Section 3.1.
Figures 7(b)&7(c) show the size of PIT-In and PIT-
Out respectively. The sizes of the PIT databases of
RRP and SPP are orders of magnitude lower than the
databases maintained by the flooding protocol. This is
because the flooding protocol forwards advertisements
about all the possible secure paths. Note, that RRP
is able to discover all roles discovered by the flooding
protocol without the need to maintain large PIT-In and
PIT-Out databases.
In the next experiment p was set to 0.3 and the
metrics were accumulated at each simulation step.
Figure 8(a) shows that the RRP and the flooding
protocol converge to the same number of discovered
roles. Figures 8(b)&8(c) show that the PIT databases
maintained by RRP and SPP are smaller than the
PIT databases maintained by the flooding algorithm
throughout the simulation period. Furthermore, the
results in Figure 8 show that the RRP algorithm con-
verges as indicated by the flat region in the curves.
Figure 9 shows more detailed results for RRP metrics
plotted with respect to p and simulation step.
4.2. Varying Maximum Path Length Pmax
The value of Pmax controls the maximum path
length of forwarded paths. In this section the value
of Pmax was varied and metrics were collected for
collaboration environments consisting of 100 domains.
The neighborhood probability p was set to 0.5. Fig-
ure 10, shows metrics generated for different Pmax val-
ues. Note that beyond a certain Pmax all the collected
metrics reach a plateau, for example in Figure 10(a) the
number of discovered roles for RRP stays at 27 roles
for values of Pmax ≥ 8. The value of Pmax could be
used to control the behavior of the routing algorithm,
for example if Pmax is set to 5 all three protocols tend
to discover the same number of roles, as can be seen in
Figure 10(a).
Note that, for all values of Pmax the number of
roles discovered by RRP is equal to that of the flooding
algorithm. Furthermore, RRP is able to discover the
same number of roles while maintaining smaller PIT
databases as indicated in Figures 10(b)&10(c).
5. Related Work
The problem of secure mediator-free interoperabil-
ity in a multi-domain environment has been addressed
in [26, 27]. Where they proposed an on-demand ac-
cess path discovery protocol which is a flooding proto-
col. Such an on-demand technique provides no perfor-
mance guarantees and does not target optimal paths.
As we have shown in Section 4 that RRP is able to dis-
cover all the roles discovered by the flooding algorithm.
Additionally, RRP requires a very low network over-
head when compared to the flooding algorithm. The
problem of secure interoperation in multi-domain en-
vironment has been addressed in [13, 14, 25]. In all
such approaches a trusted third party that has a global
view of the collaboration environment is required to
perform the security policy composition and integra-
tion. Dawson et al. [9] presented a mediator based ap-
proach to provide secure interoperability for heteroge-
neous databases. In this approach all access requests go
through the central mediator which has a global view
of the collaboration environment. Other approaches re-
lated to centralized database collaboration have been
proposed in [19, 15, 29, 30].
Another area of related research is in path vector
network protocols such as the Border Gateway Proto-
col (BGP) [24, 21]. Although not specified in the BGP
standard, most vendor implementations ultimately de-
fault to best path selection based on path length [16].
RRP’s goal is to discover optimal paths which are se-
cure and are of minimal length. Furthermore, in BGP
there is no notion of restricted access links R.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how to achieve de-
centralized, mediator-free role routing protocol based
on the collaboration of neighboring domains. We first
presented a role routing mechanism that facilitates
the storage and propagation of secure, minimal-length
paths to reachable roles in other domains. We showed
the correctness and security of the routing mechanism.
Finally, we presented experimental results that pro-
vided a comparison of the RRP with the flooding and
the shortest path protocols.
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